WELL ENGINEERING & OPERATIONS SAFETY CASE ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE –

3 DUPONT ENGINEERING POLYMERS PLANEA PRODUCIR UNA
EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING RESEARCH INSTITUTE OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF ENGINEERING AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES TAUGHT

GR5N 22 SVQ PERFORMING ENGINEERING OPERATIONS AT SCQF
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MANUAL HANDLING VISIT REPORT

Well Engineering & Operations Safety Case Assessment Template – Non-Production Installation

WELL ENGINEERING & OPERATIONS SAFETY CASE ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE –

Case Title - [Safety Case Title] COIN Case Number - [Case]

CAP Reference No: [Ref Number]

Duty Holder – [Company Name] Topic Assessor – [Name]


WELL ENGINEERING & OPERATIONS SAFETY CASE ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE – NON-PRODUCTION INSTALLATION


Work Instructions


Topic specialists should use this template to record their assessment of the Well Engineering and Operations aspects of a safety case. Assessment should be against the requirements of SCR2015.


Exemplar Approach - This template should be used in accordance with the scope of the Assessment Instructions when the topic is included for assessment. An exemplar approach may be sufficient if some material has been previously accepted and has not materially changed. For example a CMAPP or SEMS from an existing, accepted safety case.


The template is one of a series covering all assessment topics, which together form a complete record of the safety case assessment and create evidence of how the decision to accept the case, or not, was reached. The templates identify the specific regulatory requirements of SCR2015 for the topic and indicate what the competent authority expects to find within a safety case to demonstrate that those requirements are met. The template complements the published guidance that supports the regulations and topic sector guidance. The templates are available to promote transparency and assist duty holders in drafting submissions.


Green text indicates regulatory requirements that are new in SCR2015.

Black text represents regulatory requirements that are contained in both SCR2005 and SCR2015.


Non Acceptance Issue - A Non Acceptance Issue (NAI) is a deficiency in the demonstration made within a safety case, which, if not resolved, will prevent the case from being accepted under the relevant statutory provisions. Non Acceptance Issues must be sent by a formal letter to the duty holder requiring them to be dealt with in the appropriate manner, giving the duty holder a clear understanding of how to address the deficiency.

Clarification - A Clarification is an explanation provided by a duty holder on request during assessment to enable the assessing Inspectors to be confident of their interpretation of the information in a safety case. Clarifications are a routine part of assessment work and should be raised with a duty holder promptly. Clarifications do not require formal letters. Communicating by telephone and email is sufficient. A meeting between the duty holder and relevant topic specialists may also be appropriate in some circumstances for clarifications. Clarification is not a first stage before raising non-acceptance issues. Any aspect that could credibly lead to a Non-Acceptance Issue should be raised as such in the first instance.


Relevant Pre-Existing Guidance



The factual information should meet the SCR2015 requirements and provide sufficient detail to support the arguments made in the case


Management of health and safety


The safety case should demonstrate that the management system is adequate to ensure compliance with the relevant statutory provisions…


The management system should show an appropriate level of control during each phase of the installation life cycle, including design, construction, commissioning, operation, decommissioning and dismantlement


Major accident hazard identification


A systematic process should be used to identify all reasonably foreseeable major accident hazards that apply to the installation, together with potential initiating events or sequences of events


Major accident risk evaluation


The methodology and evaluation criteria adopted for major accident risk assessment should be clear


Any criteria for eliminating the less significant risks from detailed consideration in the major accident risk evaluation should be explained


The assessment should take account of people exposed to exceptional risks


The major accident risk evaluation should take account of human factors


Conclusions reached in risk assessment processes should take uncertainty into account


The identification of risk reduction measures should be systematic and take into account new knowledge


The reasoning behind the choice of risk reduction measures to be implemented should be described. Decisions on implementation should take reasonable practicability into account


Risk reduction measures identified, as part of the risk assessment, should be implemented if they are reasonably practicable


In deciding what is reasonably practicable, the case should show how relevant good practice and judgement based on sound engineering, management and human factors principles have been taken into account


Where remedial measures are proposed to reduce risk, the timescale for implementing them should take account of the extent of such risks and any practical issues involved


Major accident risk management


Measures taken to manage major accident hazards should be described


The safety case should explain how inherently safer design concepts have been applied in the design decisions taken


The measures for preventing major accident hazards should take account of the various activities undertaken during the installation's current phase of operation


Appropriate detection measures should be provided for any reasonably foreseeable event requiring an emergency response


Appropriate control and mitigation measures should be provided to protect personnel from the consequences of a major accident


Arrangements for controlling an emergency should take account of likely conditions during emergency scenarios


Emergency response


Evacuation and escape arrangements should be integrated in a logical and systematic manner, taking account of the environment in which they may need to function


Combined operations


The management system should address the additional risks associated with combined operations


A systematic approach should be taken to assessing the impact of combined operations on the conclusions of the operational safety case for each installation


A systematic approach should be taken to identifying and assessing any additional major accident hazards arising from combined operations. These can be new hazards or changes to existing hazards


The measures for emergency response should be appropriate to the particular combined operation






2.4.1 Wells risk evaluation and management




The following documents are industry guidance that can aid in determining if the duty holder is following good industry practice:


Well Lifecycle Practices Forum



Energy Institute




1. Safety case for non-production installation requirements


a) SCR2015 Schedule 7 – Particulars to be included in a safety case for the operation of a non-production installation


SCR2015 Regulatory Requirement

Clarification

NAI

1. The name and address of the owner of the installation.

2. The maximum number of persons—

(a) expected to be on the installation at any time;

(b) that may, in normal operating conditions and within design constraints, be on the installation at any time; and

(c) for whom accommodation is to be provided.

5. An adequate description of the owner’s safety and environmental management system, including information from it that is relevant to the non-production installation.

7. A description of the main requirements in the specification for the design of the installation and its plant, which must include—

(a) any limits for safe operation or use specified therein;

(c) a description of how the owner has ensured, or will ensure, the suitability of the safety and environmental-critical elements; and

(d) any relevant codes, standards and guidance used in the construction and commissioning of the installation.

8. Particulars of—

(a) the limits of the environmental and meteorological conditions beyond which the installation cannot safely be stationed or operated;

(b) the properties of the seabed and subsoil which are necessary for the safe stationing and operation of the installation; and

(c) the locations in which the installation may be stationed and operated safely.

9. A description of the arrangements for—

(a) identifying the risks from seabed and marine hazards, including the routes and locations of pipelines, moorings of adjacent installations, wells and other subsea equipment; and

(b) assessing the risks that they pose to the installation.

10. A description, with suitable diagrams, of the installation, including a description of—

(a) the main and secondary structure of the installation and its materials;

(b) its plant;

(c) the layout and configuration of its plant; and

(d) in the case of a mobile installation, its means of transfer between locations and its stationing system.

11. Particulars of the types of operation, and activities in connection with an operation, which the installation is capable of performing.

12. Particulars of the plant and arrangements for the control of—

(a) any well operations, including those—

(i) to control pressure in a well;

(ii) to prevent the uncontrolled release of hazardous substances; and

(iii) to minimise the effects of damage to subsea equipment by drilling equipment;

(b) process safety;

(c) the containment of hazardous substances (not already addressed under subparagraph (a)(ii);

(d) the prevention of fire and explosion; and

(e) the protection of the environment from a major accident.

13. A description of how the duty holder has ensured, or will ensure, compliance with regulation 4(1) of the PFEER Regulations.

15. A description of the plant used and arrangements made for protecting persons on the installation from hazardous substances including toxic gas at all times.

16. A description of the measures taken or to be taken or the arrangements made or to be made for the protection of persons on the installation from hazards, including explosion, fire, heat, smoke, toxic gas or fumes in particular during any period while they may need to remain on the installation following an incident which is beyond immediate control and for enabling such persons to be evacuated or rescued from the installation where necessary, including provision for—

(a) temporary refuge;

(b) routes from locations where persons may be present to temporary refuge and for egress therefrom to points from where the installation may be evacuated;

(c) means of evacuation at those points; and

(d) facilities within temporary refuge for the monitoring and control of the incident and for organising evacuation.

17. The description of the internal emergency response arrangements.

19. Particulars of any combined operations which may involve the installation, including—

(a) a summary of the arrangements in place for co-ordinating the management systems of all duty holders involved in any such combined operation;

(b) a summary of the arrangements in place for a joint review of the safety aspects of any such combined operation by all duty holders involved, which must include the identification of hazards with the potential to cause a major accident and the assessment of risks which may arise during any such combined operation;

(c) the plant likely to be used during any such combined operation; and

(d) the likely impact any such combined operation may have on the installations involved.

20. Any other relevant details.

Assessment Criteria / Minimum Information

SC Ref

Criteria Met / Not Met - Assessment Comments

Para 1 - Does the safety case have the name and address of the owner of the installation?

(APOSC Principle 1)





Para 2(a), (b) & (c) - Does the safety case identify who shall be aboard during well operations? Well operations can include: well construction, intervention, workover and abandonments.

(APOSC Principles 1 & 2)





Para 5 - Does the safety case have an adequate description of the owner’s safety and environmental management system, with respect to well operations?


Does it contain details of the following?


      • Manning philosophy for well operations

      • Well operations organisation

      • Health and safety policy in well operations

      • Competency / training in well operations


(APOSC Principle 2)





Para 7(a) – Does the safety case detail safe operating limits for the equipment used to conduct well operations?

Para 7(c) – Does the safety case describe how the owner has ensured or will ensure the suitability of the SECE?

Para 7(d) – Are the relevant codes, standards and guidance used in the construction and commissioning of the equipment used in well operations detailed in the safety case?

(APOSC Principles 1)





Para 10(a)(b)(c) & (d) - Does the safety case contain descriptions with suitable diagrams of the equipment used in well operations?


Does it contain the following?


      • Rig power systems

      • Drilling equipment

      • Fluid handling equipment

      • Temporary production test equipment

      • Gas handling facilities

      • Derrick / rig floor

      • Well operations lifting equipment

      • Installation hazardous areas


(APOSC Principle 1)





Para 11 - Does the safety case contain details of what type of well operations the installation is capable of performing?

(APOSC Principle 17)





Para 12(a)(i)(ii)(iii) - Does the safety case contain particulars of the plant and arrangements used for the control of any well operations, including the control of the pressure in the well, to prevent the uncontrolled release of hazardous substances; and to minimise the effects of damage to subsea wells by drilling equipment.


Does it contain details of the following?

      • Well pressure control equipment

      • Well shut-in systems

      • Protection against dropped / swinging load



(APOSC Principle 19)





Para 12(b) – Does the safety case contain particulars of the plant and arrangements used for well related process safety?


Does it contain details of the following?

      • Details of the well operations MAH, and identified mitigation measures for them.

      • Shallow gas identification evaluation

      • Shallow gas procedures

      • Well control procedures


(APOSC Principles 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 &14)





Para 12(c) – Does the safety case require to contain particulars of the plant and arrangements used for the containment of hazardous substances (not already addressed under subparagraph (a)(ii))


(APOSC Principles 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 &14)





Para 12(d) – Does the safety case contain particulars of the plant and arrangements used for the prevention of well operations related fire and explosion?


Does it contain details of the following?

      • Well operations procedures


(APOSC Principle 15)





Para 13 – What arrangements are in place for controlling a well related emergency. What are the roles and responsibilities during well control incidents?

Para 17 - How are well operation emergency situations included in the internal emergency response arrangements.


(APOSC Principle 20)





Para 15 - Does the safety case contain a description of the plant used and arrangements made for protecting persons on the installation from hazardous substances, including toxic gas at all times?


Does it contain details of the following?

      • Well operations fire, gas and hydrogen sulphide detection.


(APOSC Principle 18)





Para 16(b) – Does the safety case provide details of the escape routes from well operations areas?

Para 16(d) – Does the safety case provide details of how the well can be monitored and controlled in the event of an emergency?


(APOSC Principle 24)





Para 19(a)(b)(c) & (d) – Does the safety case contain particulars of any combined operations which may involve the installation.


Does it contain details of the following?

      • Does it detail how the arrangements for the management systems of all duty holders involved in the combined operations will be co-ordinated.

      • Does it summarise the arrangements for a joint review of the safety aspects of any such combined operation by all duty holders involved, which must include the identification of hazards with the potential to cause a major accident and the assessment of risks which may arise during any such combined operation

      • the plant likely to be used during any such combined operation, such as an integrated production emergency shut-down (ESD) system.

      • the likely impact any such combined operation may have on the installations involved


(APOSC Principles 28,29,30 & 31)





Para 20 – Any other relevant details put forward by the duty holder.


(APOSC Principal not applicable)






WELL ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS Requirements - Assessment Summary


NAI – Non Acceptance Issue


SCR2015 Regulatory Requirement

Clarification

Required

NAI Required

Conclusion

1. Non-production Installation Safety Case Requirements




  1. Schedule 7 – Particulars to be included in a safety case for a non-production installation

















TRIM: 2016/387730 Revised: November 2017 Page 12 of 12

Owner: ED 6


THE DEPARTMENT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOMOLECULAR ENGINEERING COMMITTEE
TISSUE ENGINEERING PERIPHERAL NERVE 251108 PERIPHERAL NERVOUS
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