DEALING WITH `PARIAH STATES SOME THOUGHTS JOE STORK ADVOCACY

APPENDIX E GUIDELINES FOR MANAGERS DEALING WITH ALCOHOL
DEALING WITH DAMP CONDENSATION AND MOULD GROWTH IN
DEALING WITH THE MEDIA IN THE EVENT

7 C’S OF DEALING WITH DIFFICULT MEMBERS COMPLIMENT DIFFICULT
ACI DEALING SIMULATION KUALA LUMPUR MALAYSIA DAY ONE –
ADOLESCENT PERSPECTIVES ON DEATH WHY IS DEALING WITH DEATH

DEALING WITH `PARIAH STATES': SOME THOUGHTS

Joe Stork

Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch/Middle East, Washington DC

1. "Pariah state" (or its main American variant, "rogue state") is a

term of stigmatization, not analysis. To be useful, stigmatization

should be grounded in analysis and documentation, and deployed in a

way that is both selective and consistent. There is nothing inherently

illegitimate or improper in its use: an organization like Human Rights

Watch regularly attempts to stigmatize governments; it is one of the

few techniques at our disposal in our efforts to shame governments to

end abusive human rights practices. The question should be whether

this particular category can be constructive and effective.

The "rogue state" concept was introduced by the United States into

Western political discourse at an identifiable moment, to replace the

now-departed "evil empire," as Ronald Reagan famously referred to the

Soviet Union. One of its earliest appearances came in the title of a

1988 report issued by the Center for Strategic and International

Studies, Meeting the Mavericks: Regional Challenges for the Next

President. The "mavericks"-- "southern" regional powers with hegemonic

ambitions, possessing or actively seeking advanced and

non-conventional military capabilities, and perceived to be hostile to

US interests--would soon fill what two years later Sam Nunn, then

chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, called the "threat

blank" in the Pentagon budget being proposed by the Bush

administration. The concept acquired vivid embodiment and budgetable

political currency when Iraq--heretofore a state whose military

proliferation proclivities were nurtured and whose appalling treatment

of its own citizens was purposefully overlooked by numerous Western

powers--invaded Kuwait and provoked the Gulf war of 1991.

The "pariah state" concept derives from and plays most effectively

to domestic rather than international or inter-governmental politics

and mobilization. The international consensus regarding Iraq's

"pariah" status exists towards few other governments. That consensus

has been strained or at least its capacities gravely diminished by,

among other things, its less discriminate invocation against other

adversaries. The rootedness of the stigmatization of Iran in US

domestic politics is evident in the fact that enthusiasm for this

project barely extends to the foreign policy makers of the Clinton

administration itself, never mind to the governments of US allies. As

an element in policy formation in Washington, it somewhat resembles

the way the dynamics of political militance in Iran have preserved

(until now at least) the utility of the "great Satan" label to

mobilize factions and to constrain the emergence of a policy of

"engagement" from that side.

The issue of how a regime treats its own people, and to what extent

that treatment is in violation of fundamental international norms, has

generally been a piece of the political charge sheet against the

"rogue" governments. Regrettably, though, such invocation has almost

always been more ritualistic than reflective of policy priorities. One

has to add that the "critical engagement" alternative has, in

practice, been similarly opportunistic in voicing concern for human

rights yet not terribly serious in demanding improved behavior as a

component of engagement.

2. With regard to the question that brings this group together--how

to deal with "pariah states"--I would make one unsurprising

suggestion: give more attention--serious attention--to how human

rights issues can be used effectively. The term "outlaw" has been

employed interchangeably with "rogue" and "pariah," and points to a

missed option in Western, and especially US, approaches to the problem

of managing regional challenges to the existing global order--namely,

using international human rights and humanitarian law to help isolate

and/or transform offending regimes in a manner that sets helpful

precedents and strengthens the concept of accountability for criminal

behavior by state parties.

I am not suggesting this as a one-step solution to the dilemma of

dealing with the challenges posed by the "roguish behavior" of Iraq or

Iran or any other state. I argue instead that human rights be given

due weight, for practical political and strategic purposes as well as

for moral and legal reasons. It is the offending government which is

the outcast, and the international community, or those states claiming

to act on its behalf, have an obligation to take practical steps to

protect the subject people of a "pariah" regime while bringing

pressure on the target government. In the case of Iraq, for instance,

the perseverance of the Security Council in monitoring and exposing

Baghdad's weapons projects has accomplished a great deal, even if it

has not yet (and perhaps cannot) eliminate definitively Iraq's future

capacity to menace its neighbors. A similar effort--for instance, by

responding to Special Rapporteur Max van der Stoel's request to deploy

human rights monitors--is required to help impede that government's

repeated depredations against its own citizens. When Iraq intervened

in northern Iraq in August-September 1996, for instance, the greatest

risk was immediately to members of the opposition, Arabs and Kurds,

and over the longer term to the Kurdish population generally. The US

response at the time--extending the southern no-fly zone and launching

a volley of Tomahawk missiles against various regime

installations--was irrelevant to the plight of most Iraqis: human

rights protection offered a viable rationale consistent with

international law--if this was actually desired--to challenge Iraq's

incursion into a portion of what is, after all, its sovereign

territory.

Iran's human rights record is also dismal, but the presidential

election campaign and victory of Muhammad Khatami, and the subsequent

extent and visibility of both elite and popular dissent in the country

suggests that issues of human rights, rule of law, and official

accountability may have considerable transformative power, in spite of

frequent government declamations against the universality of core

human rights standards and specious insistence on the particularity of

Iranian and Islamic cultural norms. The extent to which such a

transformation may affect foreign policy areas is unclear, though it

should at least alter the government's past penchant for assassinating

critics abroad (as well as at home). But it is in the realm of

domestic civil rights that the new government has staked its

reputation. Western governments should jointly encourage the Iranian

authorities to move beyond its so far limited and cautions steps in

the sphere of publications and cultural production to institute

transparency and accountability in its dealings with its citizens, to

respect in practice the rights of peaceful association guaranteed in

the Iranian constitution, and to carry out independent public

inquiries into official involvement in gross human rights abuses such

as torture and extrajudicial killings.

3. The Iraq and Iran situations both call for strong human rights

interventions from the international community, and in both cases such

interventions can support broader policy goals. Some suggestions

appropriate to the different regime contexts follow:

Iraq: There exists a prima facie criminal case against the government

of Iraq for its self-documented campaign of genocide against the

country's Kurdish population in the late 1980s, as well as for

atrocities, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed against

other sectors of the Iraqi population and against residents of Kuwait

during the 1990-91 occupation. Human Rights Watch has long urged

Washington and other capitals to build an international coalition to

bring suit against Hussein and other Iraqi leaders for this and

related crimes, either via a special criminal tribunal under some form

of UN sponsorship, or via a case brought to the International Court of

Justice. There would remain the matter of enforceable judgement, and

this would not represent a single-step solution to the challenges

posed by this particular "pariah," but the international censure that

would come with public exposure would give a measure of protection to

a population whose vulnerability remains great. It would likely help

undermine (though certainly not eliminate) such popular and

governmental support for Baghdad as exists in the region and beyond,

and would help make more consequential such sanctions as the

recently-approved ban on travel by high Iraqi government officials. It

could also serve as a basis for intrusive human rights monitoring

similar even if not equivalent to that of UNSCOM in the weapons

domain. Finally, it could provide additional political and

international legal grounds for requiring a change of regime, and for

legitimating international efforts toward that end.

Iran: By contrast to Iraq, where the government displays no

significant splits and no viable organized opposition appears to

exist, Iran's government comprises several distinct power centers, one

of which has taken tentative steps toward modifying some government

infringements basic human rights. The recent period has also seen the

emergence of sizable currents of dissent pressing for fundamental

changes of policy and even state structure. These developments should

be appropriately encouraged.

While such an approach probably requires some measure of

engagement, outside powers should condition this engagement, and

especially any extension or deepening of such engagement (providing

concessionary trade credits, for instance) on specific and measurable

steps by the Iranian authorities. These should include the following:

Repudiate publicly statements by government officials that sanction

or appear to sanction extrajudicial killings of opponents of the

government at home or abroad, or indiscriminate attacks against

civilians abroad, and hold accountable those responsible for ordering

or carrying out such attacks.

Take punitive and preventive measures to curb the violent

activities of hizbollahi groups against Iranians attempting to

exercise their rights to freedom of assembly and expression.

Halt the prosecution and harassment of writers and publishers for

exercising their right to free expression, and repudiate the edict

calling for the death of novelist Salman Rushdie.

Cease officially sanctioned discrimination against and persecution

of religious and ethnic minorities, including Baha'is, evangelical

Christians, and Sunni Muslims.

Release those Iranians convicted and imprisoned or detained without

charge for the peaceful expression of political views.

This set of demands surely would have the endorsement of the EU

states and the US alike, and we would like to see some serious effort

made to develop a coordinated approach towards the government of Iran.

Of course, this does not address other areas of concern which lie

outside of the mandate of my organization, such as weapons

development. Speaking in my individual capacity, however, it is

difficult to conceive of progress and resolution of these areas of

conflict without negotiations in which the US is a participant.

I do not propose the above rights-related steps as demands that

should precede all other concerns. Rather, they represent issues

around which there is broad agreement by Western allies. The new

government in Iran, moreover, in response to popular and elite dissent

in the country, has indicated that this is one realm where it has a

clear interest in making reforms and may have some space vis-a-vis the

faction of the Leader to do so, independent of negotiations with

outside governments.

4. The political weapon of choice against "pariah states" has been

military and economic embargos and sanctions. Such sanctions, to be

effective, require a high degree of international consensus, first of

all among governments but also among publics. To be effective when

used with the objective of effecting a change of regime, economic

(though not military) sanctions also require a sizable constituency

within the target polity, as was the case with South Africa under the

apartheid regime and in Haiti.

In devising means to compel changes in the composition or behavior

of a "pariah state," outside powers themselves or acting in concert

through the UN Security Council or some other body must themselves

comply with international law. Comprehensive economic sanctions such

as those imposed on Iraq, for instance, should be reviewed to insure

that their application conforms to international humanitarian law,

which forbids targeting of civilians as a method of warfare or in

retaliation for actions by the government.

5. Giving greater weight to human rights concerns can help ostracize

an offending regime. and can provide useful benchmarks for assessing a

government's seriousness regarding reform in a crucial and telling

area.. But it brings with it a responsibility to respond to abusive

practices and to make serious efforts to protect vulnerable

populations in the target country. To use human rights as a rhetorical

stick against a government, while giving those issues no priority in

formulating and implementing policy--which has arguably been the case

with regard to both Iraq and Iran--is worse than useless, for it

demeans the concept severely in the eyes of all concerned.

This points to the need to use the "pariah" label more sparingly,

if the intent is to develop some measure of regional and/or

international consensus and cooperation in compelling or stimulating

change of regime or of basic regime behavior.

In the same vein, on the issue of a government's compliance with

international human rights standards (and in my personal opinion on

other issues such as weapons control regimes as well) there is a need

for greater consistency. This does not mean that we would expect the

US or the EU to accord "pariah" status to a government like Egypt,

Saudi Arabia or Israel on account of serious and persistent human

rights abuses. But it does mean that those abusive practices should

come in for public as well as private criticism, and clear indications

that the continuation of abusive practices as matters of state policy

will have a negative impact on that government's relationship with the

US or the EU and member states. It becomes a serious strain on

credibility when condemnations of torture and suppression of free

expression, for instance, are directed solely against states in an

adversarial relationship with one or several Western powers, while

excusing or persistently overlooking much the same behavior when

committed by a close ally. This point is raised not as an abstract

ethical consideration but out of concern for the corrosive impact of

double standards on international efforts to compel compliance with

legitimate international concerns, such as arms control and human

rights behavior. In the absence of a serious effort to correct the

"double standards" problem, it would be better for Western governments

to cease entirely their present claims that human rights are central

to their foreign policies.

ENDS

AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION IN DEALING WITH POLLUTION OF THE
ANNEX B IDT’S INQUIRY IN RELATION TO DEALING IN
ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH STANDARDS ALLEGATIONS UNDER THE LOCALISM

Tags: advocacy director,, stork, `pariah, advocacy, states, thoughts, dealing